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Abstract:
In its judgment of the 19th of November 2013, Belgium’s highest court, the Court of
Cassation, confirmed an earlier judgment of the so-called kamer van inbeschuldiging-
stelling (KI) of the Court of Appeal in Ghent in response to a surrender demanded in
accordance with a number of European arrest warrants issued by Spain. This surrender
was brushed off the table by the KI on the basis of a motivation basedon themutual
trust concerning thecompliance with fundamental rights within the context of European
cooperation in criminal matters.2This motivation seems bound to raise eyebrows
amongst those who advocate this classic tenet of cross-border cooperation.This article
frames this recent judgement within a European context, and investigates whether there
is indeeda European tendency to step away from blind trust in lieu of (successfully) in-
voking fundamental rights to refuse cooperation. The case under scrutiny already seems
to be pointing in that direction as far as the member states are concerned. Moreover, it
seems to be confirmed by recent statements within the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
by the Advocates General, as well as through the new procedural wind blowing
through the Union with the Procedural Roadmap. On the other hand, the ECJ shows
itself more reluctant than expected, giving rise to a situation in which member states
1 The author is a Researcher at the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy
(IRCP) at the Department of Criminology, Criminal Law and Social Law of the Ghent
University. His research focuses on the European Criminal Policy and the position of
mentally disordered suspects and offenders in European Criminal Law. Corresponding
author: Dr. Michaël Meysman, RE023, IRCP, Universiteitstraat 4, 9000
Gent.Michael.Meysman@ugent.be.This Article is an adaptation and update of a previously
published contribution to Pantopticon, Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, Criminologie en
Forensisch Welzijnswerk, 2014
2 In the context of mutual recognition, the term ‘European cooperation in criminal matters’ still
primordially intends judicial cooperation, often to the critique of scholars, see, f.i.: G. Ver-
meulen, Het Stockholm-zwartboekjustitieenpolitie.Een trieste inventaris van Belgische en Eu-
ropese onverantwoordelijkheid en visieloosheid. Panopticon Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht,
Criminologie en Forensisch welzijnswerk(Panopticon), 34 (5), 2013, pp. 349-367.
DOI: 10.5771/2193-5505-2016-2-186
https://doi.org/10.5771/2193-5505-2016-2-186
Generiert durch Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, am 02.04.2020, 12:08:34.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
and involved individuals remain in the dark with regard to a consistent line on the
complex relation between smooth European cooperation in criminal cases and respect
for fundamental rights. The Union moreover appears to be increasingly moving away
from cooperation in criminal cases – despite the fact that it concerns a competence en-
shrined in treaty law – in exchange for a harmonisation of national (minimum) stan-
dards. A noble motive, which in this case however carries the potential to further com-
plicate, or even undermine, the necessary trust and guarantees for fundamental rights in
criminal cases. The recent judgement by the Court of Cassation also demonstrates that
the matter of human rights requires an adequate response, not only to permanently en-
sure and improve the protection of fundamental rights, but also to avoid that more and
more spanners are thrown in the works of smooth European cooperation in criminal
matters.
Key words: Moreno & Garcia – Gomez &Ugarte – Jauregui Espina – mutual recogni-
tion- fundamental rights – European Arrest Warrant
Introduction: Déjà vu for the European arrest warrant?
On the 19th of November 2013, the Belgian Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal
against the ruling of the KI3of the Ghent Court of Appeal4, in which the latter had op-
posed the surrender to the Spain of Maria Natividad – ‘Jaione’ – Jauregui Espina5on
the basis of two6 European arrest warrants (EAW).7The Ghent KI had ruled that the
surrender to Spain of Jauregui Espina8, affiliated to the Basque resistance and separatist
I.
3 Under Belgian law, the KI decides – but only for the most serious offences – at the end of a
judicial investigation whether there is enough evidence of guilt against a defendant under
criminal investigation. When sufficient evidence is provided the KI will refer the suspect to the
highest criminal court (Assisen). In an EAW context, the KI needs to decide on whether suffi-
cient elements are available to decide on its execution. The KI also acts as a court of appeal
against decisions by the Raadkamer (see infra).
4 Hof van Cassatie, 19 november 2013, AR P.13.1765.N, via: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdf
app/download_blob?idpdf=N-20131119-5.
5 This article wishes, by all means, to refrain from detracting the privacy and anonimity of the
persons involved. But in light of previous coverage of the case in the weekly periodical ‘knack’
(dossier Knack, 23 October 2013) and Ms. Jauregui Espina’s own contribution – under the
pseudonym ‘Jaione’ – to a relatively well known and popular cooking book (Eenvreemd
Gents kookboek, uitgeverijLannoo), it seemed appropriate to refer to the person involved by
name and surname.
6 The EAW’s were issued on 9th July, 2004 and 1st December, 2005 respectively.
7 The European Arrest Warrant was introduced with the Council Framework Decision of 13
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member
States (2002/584/JHA). Available via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:32002F0584&from=EN.
8 Jauregui Espina was linked in both European Arrest Warrants to the Bask ETA and was sus-
pected of attempted murder and terrorism (EAW of 2004), participation to a criminal organi-
sation, terrorism, manslaughter, aggravated assault and murder (EAW of 2005). These accusa-
tions were based on her – putative – involvement in facts that occurred in Bilbao on the 14th
of June and 19th of January 1981.
Michaël Meysman · Belgium and the European Arrest Warrant 187
EuCLR Vol. 6, 2/2016
https://doi.org/10.5771/2193-5505-2016-2-186
Generiert durch Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, am 02.04.2020, 12:08:34.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
movement ETA9, would entail a risk of fundamental rights infringement as guaranteed
in article six of the Treaty on the European Union.10 The federal prosecutor had ap-
pealed against this ruling pleading the insufficient justification by the KI of its deci-
sion, as well as a violation of Article 4, 5 ° of Belgium’s Law on the European Arrest
Warrant (“Wet EAB”)11 but, as mentioned, to little avail before the high Court.The
narrative and content of this case will undoubtedly instil an unpleasant feeling of déjà
vu in both the Belgian and Spanish (judicial) authorities. The setting – a procedure that
concerns the surrender on the basis of a European arrest warrant – as well as involved
actors – the KI, federal prosecutor, Court of Cassation – and context – a Spanish
Basque affiliated to ETA and suspected of (involvement in) serious crimes – are all
heavily reminiscent of the Moreno-Garcia case. The same is also true for the result of
the procedure, in which the KI (this time to the Court of Appeal of Antwerp) in its
ruling on the 23rd of June 2004 opposed the surrender of this Spanish – Basque couple.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the Jauregui Espina case should not be examined
through the exact same lens given that, rather than old wine in a new bottle, it con-
cerns a substantially different approach by the Belgian judicial authorities to the issue
of surrender on the basis of a European arrest warrant. While this is in part due to a
differing judicial context and the then inexperience in 2004 of the Belgian authorities
with the new European instrument, it also indicates a mentality change currently tak-
ing place in the field of European cooperation on criminal cases. The period following
the spate of terrorist threats and attacks that marked the first years of the new Millen-
nium were characterized by an approach that was heavily focused on prosecution,
which resulted in a wide range of instruments geared towards tracking, prosecuting
and punishing crimes with a cross-border dimension. Within this context, the Euro-
pean arrest warrant not only constitutes the first effective mutual recognition instru-
ment to be created, to date it is also the most successful.12In more recent years, how-
ever, it appears a profound change has come about in which stronger focus is placed on
9 ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna)is an armed Basque nationalist and separatist organization in
northern Spain (and southwestern France). It grew during Franco’s dictatorship and was of-
ficially founded in 1959.Originally aimed at promoting traditional Basque culture, it evolved
into a paramilitary group.Through the years, it held a violent campaign of bombing, assassi-
nations and kidnappings in the Spanish Basque country and throughout Spanish territory. Its
goal was gaining independence for the Greater Basque Country. In 2011 ETA announced a
definitive cessation of its armed activities and in 2012, the BBC reported that it was ready to
negotiate a definitive end of its operations.
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU),OJ 2012 C 326/01.
Via:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/
TXT&from=en.
11 Wet van 19 December 2003 betreffende het Europees Aanhoudingsbevel. Via: http://www.ej
ustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn=2003121932&table_name=
wet.
12 B. Thellier de Poncheville, La confiancemutuelle à l’épreuve du mandatd’arrêtEuropéen, in:
D. Zerouki-Cottin (Ed.), L’espacePénalEuropéen: À la croisée des chemins? Actes de la
journéed’études du 30 mai 2013, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Étienne, France: La Charte,
2013, pp. 29-40.
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procedural guarantees in a wider framework of conformity with fundamental rights.
This evolution will be illustrated below on the basis of a comparison between three
similar cases and with the recent ruling of the Ghent KI and its confirmation by the
Court of Cassation as terminus. Subsequently, this article will examine whether Euro-
pean criminal law is indeed witnessing a 'revival of fundamental rights' and, if this
were to be the case,what role can be attributed to the Jauregui Espina ruling in this
context.
II.Travelling back in time. The case Moreno-Garcia as a first big test for the Euro-
pean arrest warrant and the Belgian judicial system13
Hardly a month following the entry into force on 30th January, 2004 of the scantily
adopted “Wet EAB”14, Belgium found itself confronted with a European arrest war-
rant issued by Spain regarding the Moreno-Garcia couple. The duo, which was of
Spanish-Basque origin but had acquired Belgian nationality in 2001, was suspected of
participation in ETA terrorist acts, forming part of an armed gang and unlawful assem-
bly. It would not take long before the further course of the proceedings concerning ar-
rest and surrender would turn into a test case15 for the European arrest warrant. This
was due to the fact that, immediately following its issuing, the arrest warrant kicked
off a procedural Calvary which saw the couple appear four times before the KI16 and
three times before the Court of Cassation before the KI of Antwerp finally rejected
their surrender to Spain. The Belgian nationality, which was acquired by the couple
through the established procedures, turned out to be the main cause for the procedural
battle that quickly transformed into an entrenched episode of legal-technical warfare
concerning the jurisdiction and competence of the Belgian judicial authorities to deal
with the Spanish indictments by means of an EAW themselves.17 Both relevant and re-
13 This contribution only refers in a limited degree – when considered relevant – to the exten-
sive EAW-procedure in the Moreno-Garcia case. For a comprehensiveoverview, see:C. Ryn-
gaert, Het Europees aanhoudingsbevel lastens Moreno-Garcia: de aanhouder wint, Nieuw
Juridisch Weekblad (NJW), 2004, pp. 1226-1233.
14 The Belgian “Wet EAB” was only adopted by the Belgian Senate at the eleventh hour. In ac-
cordance with Article 34 (1) of the EAW Framework Decision, the Member States were due
to take all necessary measures by 31 December 2003 at the latest to comply with the Deci-
sion’s implementation in National law and in accordance with its provisions. Since the first
of January 2004, the Belgian Wet EAB is applicable for the arrest and surrender of a person
sought on the basis of an EAW.
15 L. Janssens, De zaak Moreno-Garcia, een testcase voor het Europees aanhoudingsbevel,
Noot onder Cass. 13 april 2004, Cass. 11 mei 2004 en Cass. 8 juni 2004, Rechtskundig Week-
blad(R.W.), 2004-05, 2004, pp. 1260-1262.
16 Three appearances before the Brussels KI and one (last) appearance before the Antwerp KI.
17 Describing the Moreno-Garcia case as a judicial ordeal is an understatement and doesn’t do
it justice: Even before the procedural battle concerning the EAW-Based surrender the cou-
ple, – then still under Spanish Nationality – was the subject of a complex legal imbroglio and
the target of judicial authorities flexing their muscles, both between the Belgian internal au-
thorities and between Spain and Belgium. For anextensive and enlightened analysis of thisle-
galquagmire, see:G. Vermeulen & T. Vander Beken, Uitlevering Basken aan Spanje: Juridis-
che bedenkingen bij een politieke zaak, Recente Arresten van de Raad van State, 1995, pp.
221-232.
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markable is the minimal importance that was accorded to the human rights dimension
in the course of all these proceedings.
The Moreno-Garcia defence did argue, on the basis of a report concerning Spain au-
thored by the (then) Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission for Human Rights18,
that a surrender in accordance with the European arrest warrant risked to entail an in-
fringement of their fundamental rights, but this line of defence fell on deaf ears. This
dismissal was significant, however, given that the Belgian legislator – going against the
spirit of the mutual trust tenet – had in fact included such mandatory grounds for re-
fusal in article 4,5° of its “Wet EAB”.19 As such, interestingly enough, the execution of
the Arrest Warrant never – at least formally – came under pressure because of the ap-
plied prosecutorial techniques and specific detention conditions for ETA-suspects in
Spain. Rather than focusing hereupon, the parties involved dedicated the entire proce-
dure to fixating on the techno-legal conundrums concerning the application of the oth-
er refusal ground, foreseen in Article 4, 4° of the Wet “EAB”20, whereby the Belgian
Nationality of Moreno-Garcia would prevent surrendering to Spain. With hindsight, it
seems fair to state that this approach reflects the European momentum that character-
ized the beginning of the new Millennium, given that the principle of mutual recogni-
tion in criminal cases21opposed a line of reasoning in which the executing Member
State would refuse the execution – recognition – of a judicial decision due to a lack of
confidence vis à vis the established practices and procedures of the issuing Member
State.
The basic notion that the members of the Union would be able to blindly22confide
in each other's efficiency and justness on the basis of their democratic nature and their
allegiance to European and International (Human Rights) conventions and treaties,
18 Th. Van Boven, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, 2004. Via:
http://www.apt.ch/content/files/Spain_SRT%20Report%20Feb%202004.pdf.
19 Article 4, 5° of the “Wet EAB” provides a (mandatory) refusal ground when there are sub-
stantial reasons to believe that the execution of an EAW would infringe the fundamental
rights of the persons involved as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.
20 Article 4, 4° “Wet EAB” establishes that the execution of an EAW is refused in case (4°) the
prosecution or punishment is barred under Belgian law and the Belgian courts have jurisdic-
tion to take cognisance of the facts for which the EAW was issued. The conditions under this
article need to be met cumulatively. With regards to the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts,
Articles 6 and 7 of the Belgian “Wetboek van Strafvordering” (Penal Procedure Code) state
that a person with the Belgian Nationality or with principal residence in Belgium can only be
sentenced under Belgian law under certain conditions and limited to specific offences. Inci-
dentally, these articles are the consequence of the debacle with the Belgian Genocide Law of
1993, formally abolished with the Belgian Law of 5 August 2003.
21 For a concise overview of the mutual recognition principle, see: H.G. Nilsson, From classical
judicial cooperation to mutual recognition. Revue internationale de droit pénal, 77(2006/1),
2006, pp. 53-58.
22 H. Labayle, Mandatd’arrêteuropéen et degré de protection des droits fondamentaux, quand
la confiance se fait aveugle. Groupe de Recherche – EspaceLibertéSécurité Justice, 2013. Via:
http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2013/03/03/cooperation-judiciaire-penale/mandat-darret-europeen-
et-degre-de-protection-des-droits-fondamentaux-quand-la-confiance-se-fait-aveugle/print/.
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constituted the linchpin of this discourse that had to render a swift and efficient coop-
eration in criminal cases where possible. The hotly debated23absence of (explicit)
grounds for refusalbased on the compliance withFundamental Rights and Freedomsin
the Framework Decision – be they mandatory or optional – constituted one of the
main stalking horses in the stable of mutual trust. This can, however, by no means be
understood in the sense of the Framework Decision clearing the path for a technique
of surrender that is devoid of any type of control concerning the respect of fundamen-
tal rights.24 As stated before, Member States moreover have been far from silent as far
as the introduction of grounds for refusal was concerned.25As a result hereof, the
Moreno-Garcia case occupies an important position in this context seeing that an
EAW that was issued on the basis of terror-related crimes seemed a textbook example
of the wind of change blowing in the field of European criminal law. This first major
test for the principle of mutual recognition and its flag ship, the European arrest war-
rant, clearly constituted a false start. Rather than leading to the smooth cooperation
hoped for, the Warrant became entrenched in a legal standoff between Belgium’s sitting
(bluntly put: judges, traditionally more poised to balance the pros and cons of a legal
measure) and standing magistrates (the state prosecution, traditionally aiming at fast-
track prosecution and smooth cross-border cooperation) with the Court of Cassation
in the role of headsman. The principle of mutual trust nevertheless survived this first
test, seeing that the Belgian judiciary did not have to take recourse to an own-initiative
ground for refusal concerning the guarantees for fundamental rights.
The Gomez & Ugarte case. The limited scope of the human rights argument?
It is worthwhile to briefly pay attention to the similar (and almost simultaneously oc-
curring) case of the duo Jon Lopez Gomez and Diego Ugarte Lopez de Arkaute. This
time, the Belgian judiciary did find itself obliged to pronounce itself on the possible
infringement of fundamental rights, seeing that the involved actors were not in a pos-
ition to appeal on any other grounds for refusal. Once again, the case concerned two
Basque members of ETA, who were arrested by Belgian police driving a stolen car
with false license plates. Both were the subject of a European arrest warrant issued by
Spain, and once more the above-mentioned Spain-report published by the Special Rap-
porteur of the UN was invoked by the defence. The main difference with the Moreno-
III.
23 S. Alegre & M. Leaf, Mutual recognition in European judicial cooperation: A step too far too
soon? Case study – the European arrest warrant, European Law Journal (ELJ), 10(02), 2004,
pp. 200-217; S. Dewulf, Handboek uitleveringsrecht. Intersentia, 2013, p. 244.
24 Article 1, 3. Of the EAW Framework Decision clearly stipulates that “This framework Deci-
sion shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and
fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union”.
25 European Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender pro-
cedures between Member States (revised version) {SEC(2006)79} /* COM/2006/0008 final
*/, 2006, p. 8.Via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2006:0008:FIN:EN:HTML.
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Garcia case resided in the fact that, this time, the “KI” (in Mons this time) did find it-
self obliged to pronounce itself on this argument, but finally decided that the report
referred to only carried "a limited and general value and moreover was not sufficiently
endorsed and supported by the UN Human Rights Commission".26The KI therefore
had to ascertain itself of the potential negative consequences of surrendering the in-
volved actors to Spain (and therefore also to indicate – at least implicitly – a possible
lack of trust concerning the criminal proceedings as well as the material detention con-
ditions in Spain). It finally decided, however, that there were no sufficient reasons to
justify the assumption that the implementation of the European arrest warrant would
infringe upon the fundamental rights of the accused. Moreover, this decision was not
revoked by Belgium's highest ranking court.27Also in this case, the KI found the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition to carry the strength needed to trump the special report of
the UN Human Rights Commission and brush any reasonable doubt concerning the
presupposed trust in the Spanish system off the table. The final conclusion therefore
read that there was insufficient indication that Spain was violating fundamental human
rights, which would entail an obligation to refuse the surrender conform art. 4,5°
“Wet EAB”.
A closer look at the Jauregui Espina case
Fast forward to 2013. Eight, nearly nine years after the warrants have been issued by
the Spanish authorities, Jauregui Espina is arrested by the police and taken into cus-
tody on9thOctober in Ghent upon decision (order) of the investigative judge. The
“Raadkamer”28 of Ghent decided on 16thOctober that the European arrest warrants
could be executed. Following appeal against this decision, the KI of Ghent subse-
quently amended the decision and worked and dismissed its execution.29 Taking a
closer look at the context, it is notable that, as far as the factual events are concerned,
the case is located somewhere between the cases Moreno-Garcia and Gomez-Ugarte:
While Moreno-Garcia had already acquired the Belgian nationality at the time when
IV.
26 Kamer van Inbeschuldigingstelling, Hof van Beroep Bergen, 13 mei 2004,not published; G.
Stessens, Het Europees aanhoudingsbevel. De wet van 19 december 2003, CBR Jaarboek
2004—005, Maklu, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, 2005, p. 38.
27 Hof van Cassatie, 26 mei 2004, AR P.04.0779.F, via: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/d
ownload_blob?idpdf=F-20040526-11.
28 The Raadkamer, like the KI, decides at the end of a judicial investigation whether there is
enough evidence of guilt against a defendant under criminal investigation. When sufficient
evidence, is provided, the Raadkamer will summon the suspect before the correctional crimi-
nal court. If this would not be the case, the suspect is dropped from further prosecution.
Likewise, in an EAW context, the Raadkamer needs to decide on whether sufficient elements
are available to decide on its execution. Its relation to the KI is that the latter acts as a court
of appeal for decisions of the Raadkamer. Apart from this, the KI has the exclusive compe-
tence to decide on the referral of a suspect to the highest criminal court (of Assisen) for the
most serious offences.
29 Kamer van Inbeschuldigingstelling, Hof van Beroep Gent, 31 oktober 2013, KI 2013/FP/16.
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the EAW was issued (a situation that kicked off a technical debate on conditions con-
cerning nationality and residence that would allow for prosecution by the Belgian ju-
diciary on the basis of art 4,4° Law EAW), and while Gomez-Ugarte were merely
passing through Belgium and were not in a position to claim any connections to the
country when they were arrested by the police in Boussu, which left Art. 4,5° of the
Law EAW as the only possible option, Jauregui Espina resided for years on end in
Ghent, without, however, having acquired official residence.It is, therefore, all the
more remarkable that this is precisely where Jauregui Espina's defence vested its main
hope. In its appeal against the Raadkamer’s decision, the defence stated first and fore-
most that the implementation of both EAWs had to be dismissed due the facts being
barred by Belgian law and the competence of the Belgian courts to ascertain them-
selves of the facts, an assertion based once again on a combined reading of Art. 4.4°
Law EAW and the stipulations of Belgium’s penal procedure code (Articles 6 & 7) on
the basis of which a Belgian citizen or a person holding principal residence in Belgium
(under certain conditions and for certain crimes) has to be convicted in Belgium).30Al-
though identical to the procedure in the Moreno-Garcia case, here this made little
sense as far as Jauregui Espina was concerned given her precarious situation of resi-
dence, rendering this line of defence exceptionally weak.31It therefore hardly comes as
a surprise that the KI did not accord an enormous amount of attention to this primary
objection in its judgement. It was only in the second instance that the human rights
discourse was raised as grounds for refusal, given the presumed existence of significant
indications in accordance with Art. 4, 5° of the “Wet EAB” to the effect that a surren-
der to Spain could entail a risk to a violation of the fundamental rights.
The main piece of evidence that was brought forward in support of this assertion
was a report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe.32 This country-specific re-
port also studied the separate procedures and detention conditions of persons who
were suspected of maintaining relations with ETA.33However, while the human rights
30 The facts for which she had been charged stemmed from 1981.
31 The KI, in its decision, refers to the statements regarding her residence situation as follows:
appellant claims to reside in –Ghent but refuses to specify where. Furthermore, appellant is
currently not registered in Belgium and was in fact never registered in Belgium. Similarly, for
the address where she was found, no official person was ever registered. The appellant is by
no means familiar to the public department services and the migration services. And she was
never signed in at these migration services of Ghent. The apartment was rented by someone
else.
32 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment
(CPT), Report to the Spanish government on the visit to Spain carried out by the European
committee for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
(CPT) from 31 May to 13 June 2011, 2013. via: http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/esp/
2013-06-inf-eng.pdf.
33 The so-called “Incommunicado detention” in which the persons involved are placed in
quasi-isolated detention conditions and interrogated. Both in terms of theme and scope, this
is well-nigh identical to the Van Boven report(fn. 18) in the cases Moreno-Garcia & Gomez-
Ugarte.
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argument had played no role whatsoever in the Moreno-Garcia case, and while similar
reports in the Gomez-Ugarte case had been deemed insufficient to conclude towards
the existence of substantial reasons to fear for an infringement of fundamental rights,
the KI in this case referred specifically to the CPT report in support of its refusal to
execute the mandates for arrest. This notwithstanding the striking similarity between
both concerned reports in terms of both scope and contents. As was the case for
Moreno-Garcia, we can once again refer to the clearly distinct points of view of the
sitting and standing magistrates in the present context: By mentioning the assumption
that the issuing state acts in respect of human rights as well as Spain's ratification of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Federal
Prosecutor (standing) endorsed the classical philosophy of mutual recognition in his
interpretation of Article 4,5° “Wet EAB”.34It was amply stated that Spain enjoys a
democratic tradition. With the apparent trust in the Spanish judicial system forming
the point of departure, the facts subsequently raised through the CPT report were then
checked against the stipulations of the “Wet EAB” with the Prosecutor finally con-
cluding that the “Wet EAB” only refers to substantial reasons, which means a flagrant
violation of human rights had to be in play. The facts raised on the basis of reference to
general reports by international organisations did not meet this criterion according to
the prosecutor, given they did not include (a sufficient number of) concrete elements in
order to conclude towards an infringement of the fundamental rights.
It appeared that the Prosecutor's point of view in this was supported by the Court
of Cassation. Indeed, the Court traditionally argued in the same vein that, only when
in a concrete case, it appeared from ample facts that there was a risk of flagrant viola-
tion of one or multiple fundamental rights, recourse could be taken to this ground for
refusal.35Moreover, the legacy of the case Gomez-Ugarte becomes apparent when the
prosecutor states that a (non-binding) report by an international organisation is insuf-
ficient to conclude towards a justified fear for a violation of human rights. It became
apparent, however, that the KI of Ghent was not an adept of the above mentioned clas-
sical line. On the contrary, it did not question the value of the CPT report, but ruled
that the arraignment included in the report concerning the inhuman treatment as a re-
sult of specific regimes for ETA suspects did constitute a sufficiently substantial reason
to conclude towards a potential infringement of the fundamental rights in case of exe-
cution of the EAWs. The KI then argued that the Raadkamer of Ghent and the prose-
cutor had wrongly presupposed Spain’s compliance of the fundamental rights and
boldly stated in support of this that "first and foremost there never is an assumption of
respect for human rights". In addition to this, the KI raises the “Wet EAB” itself, given
that the latter "contradicts the existence of an assumption of respect for human rights
34 Even though the federal prosecutor’s claim made the mistake of referring to Article 4, 4° and
citing it as 4, 5° “Wet EAB”.
35 Dewulf (fn. 23), p. 249. The Court of Cassation did not make this up out of thin air, but
based itself on the benchmarks of the European Court of Human Rights that, ever since the
Soering case, consistently applies the ‘flagrant’ character of a denial of infringement of funda-
mental rights as a threshold.
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seeing that the law itself provides for the possibility to demonstrate or point out the
possible existence of substantial reasons to fear for a violation of human rights and
therefore also for an (obligatory) refusal of implementation of the EAW".
The KI finally also reacted to the benchmark raised by the prosecutor to the effect
that a flagrant violation had to be in play, by stating that the “Wet EAB” did not any-
where in its provisions demanded proof of a state of absolute certainty that there had
been or would be a violation of fundamental rights. It is clear that the KI resolutely
dismisses the reasoning followed by the federal prosecutor across the line. By plainly
stating there can never be a presupposition of respect for human rights, the KI more-
over appears to do away with the philosophy of mutual recognition with the single
stroke of a pen. Nine years after Moreno Garcia, the confirmation of this decision by
the Court of Cassation appears to lend power to the notion that the principle of mutu-
al trust between the European Union's member states has reached its date of expiry.
Causal connection to a European trend?
One could ask whether the ruling of the KI in the Jauregui Espina case and the confir-
mation by the Court of Cassation can be framed within a broader European trend.
Over the course of the past years, it appears the focus has moved from swift prosecu-
tion to a European cooperation in criminal cases in which (more) attention is given to
fundamental and procedural rights. It appears that the cause for this change in attitude
is the realization that the envisioned and presupposed mutual cooperation between
member states based on mutual trust is not working as smoothly as initially hoped.
Since it was confirmed as the cornerstone of cooperation in criminal cases during the
European Council in Tampere36the concept of mutual recognition has encountered its
fair share of obstacles and controversy. The presupposed trust between member
states – and therefore the willingness to efficiently recognise and cooperate – turned
out less steadfast than expected. In the past, there were the constitutional issues related
to the principle instrument of the EAW37and the aforementioned tendency of member
states to include grounds for refusal on their own initiative. Today, it appears that the
delayed implementation and transposition of European framework decisions into na-
tional law38as well as the significant differences that exist between member states re-
garding this implementation39, constitute the main obstacles to an efficient form of
V.
36 European Council, Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1999. Via: http://w
ww.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm.
37 Alegre & Leaf, ELJ 2004.With many of the member states’ constitutional courts objecting
the surrender of own nationals under the EAW, opposed certain procedural aspects of the
EAW-procedures and, indeed, the individual rights of the persons involved.
38 Vermeulen, Panopticon2013. In this respect, it should be pointed out that Belgium serves as
one of the bad pupils in the European class. In the period of 2012-2013, Belgium implement-
ed four framework decisions in national legislation with delays (and belated deadlines) rang-
ing from six months to over five years.
39 A. Suominen, Different implementations of mutual recognition framework decisions. eu-
crim(1/2011), 2011, pp.24-27.
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mutual recognition. Until recently, the EAW was the sole instrument which, after a
false start, seemed able to weather the storm that raged in this field. Before long, how-
ever, the EAW fell victim to its own success, with the excessive and disproportional use
that was made of the instrument giving rise to criticism from practitioners40 and aca-
demics41 alike. Beyond the hesitant attitude of the member states, however, this pro-
gressive trends appears to have its roots in a more substantial issue.
The quintessence of the legitimation for the mutual recognition and cooperation be-
tween the member states was based on the supposition that all of them endorsed a mu-
tual commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy, and respect for human
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.42The collective membership of the
member states to the European Convention on Human Rights constituted the main
supporting argument in this respect.43This legitimisation, however, was dealt a couple
of hard blows over the ensuing years. First of all, the jurisprudence of the European
Court time and again raises persistent problems with regard to human rights in the
member states. As such, the statement that “Furthermore, the Convention, as inter-
preted by the European Court of Human Rights, is an important foundation for Mem-
ber States to have trust in each other’s criminal justice systems and to strengthen such
trust”44seems to be backfiring on the European institutions and the member states. Re-
40 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States
Brussels: 11.4.2011,COM/2011/175 Final, via:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/eaw_implementation_report_2011_en.pdf. In this
report, the Commission already indicated the necessity – as identified by the member states –
for a proportionality test to provide an answer for the excessive amount of EAW’s being is-
sued in Europe.
41 S. Haggenmüller, The Principle of proportionality and the European arrest warrant. Oñati
Socio-legal Series [online], 3 (1), 2013, pp. 95-106. via: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200874
42 Council of the European Union.(2001). Programme of measures to implement the principle
of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters.OJ C12/10, via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:012:0010:0010:EN:PDF.The im-
plementation programme clearly states: “That trust is grounded, in particular, on their shared
commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, funda-
mental freedoms and the rule of law.”
43 C. Van den Wyngaert, Strafrecht, strafprocesrecht & internationaal strafrecht, Deel II: Straf-
procesrecht & internationaal strafrecht, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2003, p. 1145 et seq.
44 Consideration (2) of the Procedural Roadmap: Council of the European Union. (2009). Res-
olution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspect-
ed or accused persons in criminal proceedings.OJ C 295/1, via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:295:0001:0003:EN:PDF.
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cent (2014 & 2015) convictions of both Belgium45and Spain46before the Human Rights
Court with regard to their detention conditions may serve as concrete and relevant ex-
amples in this respect. Mutual trust therefore seems to give rise to scenarios of the pot
calling the kettle black. Such confrontational human rights jurisprudence appears to
undermine, rather than strengthen, the notion that this would contribute to a strength-
ening of mutual trust. And the member states are not alone in being sensitive to this
boomerang effect. The European Union's institutions seem to be waltzing to the same
tune.
In the well-known Radu judgment by the Court of Justice that was issued following
a prejudicial question related to the implementation of EAWs47it was stated unambigu-
ously in the conclusion by Advocate General Sharpston that "“While the record of the
Member States in complying with their human rights obligations may be commend-
able, it is also not pristine. There can be no assumption that, simply because the trans-
fer of the requested person is requested by another Member State, that person’s human
rights will automatically be guaranteed on his arrival there. There can, however, be a
presumption of compliance which is rebuttable only on the clearest possible evidence.
Such evidence must be specific; propositions of a general nature, however well sup-
ported, will not suffice.”48While it is clear that the Advocate General had not warmed
up entirely to the progressive line taken by the Ghent KI in the Jauregui Espina case a
few years later, this may surely serve as proof of the fact that the Union is no longer
placing unlimited trust in the unstained reputation of its members in a framework of
European cooperation in criminal matters. Earlier, the Common European Asylum
Policy (CEAP)and the stipulations of the Dublin II Convention had also come under
fire from the European Court of Human Rights in the case MSS. vs. Belgium and
Greece.49 A few months later, the Court of Justice had to acknowledge in the context
of the similar NS. case50that the trust placed in member states by the CEAP with re-
gard to their fundamental rights compliance was in fact not waterproof.Scholars had
already been aware of this and did not spare their – often fierce – criticism of the as-
sumed mutual trust51and the potential harmful consequences vis-à-vis the fundamental
45 With eight (!) judgments confirming breaches of Articles 5 (lawful detention) and 3 (prohibi-
tion of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) ECHR on the 9th of January 2014 and very




46 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 16 oktober 2012, Otamendi Egiguren v.
Spain.via: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114095.
47 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 18.10.2012, case C-396/11, (Radu) via:http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=132981&pageIndex=0&do-
clang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=482327.
48 Ibid. Conclusion of the Advocate General, para. 41.
49 MSS. v. Belgium & Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judgment 21 January 2011.
50 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 21.12.2011, case C-411/10 & C-493/10 (“N.S.”).
51 S. Alegre, Mutual trust – Lifting the mask, in: G. De Kerkhove& A. Weyemberg (Eds.), La
confiance mutuelle dans I'espace penal Europeen; Mutual trust in the European criminal
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rights of those involved in procedures of mutual recognition, aimed at repression and
prosecution.52 Finally, one also needs to point out the role of international (non-gov-
ernmental) organisations that continuously raise these issues via monitoring and re-
ports. Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of most these organisations’ powers
and reports, their influence should not be underestimated, given they acquire a binding
force53to a certain degree via the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights. Seeing that such reporting was accepted as decisive in the Jauregui Espina case
and the motivation passed the Court of Cassation, it does not seem overly expeditious
to state that also the Belgian jurisprudence has warmed up to this European trend.
Consequences and possible solutions for European cooperation in criminal cases
A good ten years following the traumatic experiences brought about by international
and European terror, European cooperation in criminal cases finds itself at a cross
roads.54On the one hand, it seems the Union is confirming trust in mutual recognition,
decisively taking the flight forward by formally enshrining the principle in the Treaty
concerning the Functioning of the European Union (art. 82,1 TFEU).55 On the other
hand, the gap between the smooth cooperation that exists in theory and the lacklustre
implementation and use of the instruments in practice is continuously increasing, and
the ease with which member states seem to find their way to the human rights argu-
ment, to the detriment of presupposed mutual trust, appears to be steadily increasing.
These developments are moreover mutually reinforcing, posing a potential risk for the
future of mutual recognition as the crux of European cooperation in criminal cases.
The Jauregui Espina case offers a recent and interesting illustration of the fact that the
abovementioned tendencies are slowly but steadily undercutting the bastion of the
VI.
area, Brussels: Eds. de I'Universite de Bruxelles, 2005, pp. 41-45; H.G. Nilsson, Mutual trust
or mutual mistrust? In G. de Kerchove& A. Weyemberg (Eds.), La confiance mutuelle dans
l'espace penal europeen; Mutual trust in the European criminal area, Brussels: Ed. de l'Uni-
versite de Bruxelles, 2005, pp. 29-40.
52 M. Anderson, Law enforcement cooperation in the EU and fundamental rights protection,
in: Martin, M. (ed), Crime, rights and the EU: the future of police and judicial cooperation,
Justice, 2008, pp. 105-108; K. Ambos, Mutual recognition versus procedural guarantees?, in:
de Hoyos Sancho, M. (ed), Criminal proceedings in the European Union: essential safe-
guards, Lex Nova, 2008, pp. 25-38.
53 A recent and relevant example hereof is the case of L.B. v. Belgium of 2 October 2012 where
the ECtHR based its judgment concerning the breach of Article 5 ECHR regarding deten-
tion conditions for a mentally ill offender (internee) on the explicit reference to a CPT re-
port.See: L.B. c. BELGIQUE, Requête no 22831/08, judgment 02 October 2012.
54 G. Vermeulen & W. De Bondt, First things first: Characterising mutual recognition in crimi-
nal matters, in: B. De Ruyver, T. Vander Beken, F. Vander Laenen & G. Vermeulen (Eds.),
EU criminal justice, financial & economic crime : new perspectives interest-based dispute
resolution, Maklu, 2011, pp. 17-38.
55 “Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mu-
tual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions.” And this since the coming into force of
the Lisbon Reform Treaty (1 December 2009).
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EAW. While a more critical attitude rooted in a human rights reflex taking the palace of
blind trust between member states may seem a positive development, this tendency
however gives rise to a number of reflections – which will be outlined in the para-
graphs below.
The European reaction. Is the EU blowing hot and cold?
The Roadmap for procedural rights
The Union has not sat idly by while the identified issues of failing mutual trust and the
proof of poor compliance with human rights obligations by the member states were
increasing. In 2000, a first step was taken to place fundamental rights in the limelight
within the EU, via the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.56 The
fact that it would take until 2009 – the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – for the
Charter to come into force, however, is an indication of the mainly symbolic value that
was held by the instrument in its early stages. Also within the specific context of Euro-
pean cooperation in criminal cases, the European Commission started to respond – by
as early as 2003 – to the increasing criticism on mutual recognition and the lack of at-
tention for human rights exercised in the framework of the European arrest warrant
via a green paper on procedural rights.57 Following the unsuccessful ending of the am-
bitious proposal that consisted in establishing a framework decision on procedural
rights in criminal procedures58, it took until 2009 before a new measure saw the light
of day with the Roadmap on procedural rights of suspects or accused persons in crimi-
nal procedures.59
This Roadmap consists of a step-by-step approach that aims to strengthen the pro-
tection of procedural rights of suspects and accused persons via a package of – current-
1.
56 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/1, via: http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.
57 European Commission, Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants
in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union. Brussels: COM(2003) 75 final,
2003. Via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0075en01.pdf.
58 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural
rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union. COM 328 final, 2004.via:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
52004PC0328:EN:HTML.The final death knell for this instrument were the highly contested
competence of the Union to take – separate from a cross-border dimension – such initiatives
and the vagueness of the proposed rights included in the instrument. See: C. Morgan, Where
are we now with EU procedural rights? European Human Rights Law Review(4), 2012, pp.
427-432; G. Vermeulen & L. van Puyenbroeck, Towards minimum procedural guarantees for
the defence in criminal proceedings in the EU. International and Comparative Law Quarter-
ly (ICLQ), 60(04), 2011, pp. 1017-1038.
59 Council of the European Union, Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings. OJ
C 295/1, 2009, via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:295:
0001:0003:EN:PDF.
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ly six60 – measures. So far, the first four measures have already been turned into three
Directives.61 The Roadmap starts by providing an explanation for its main raison
d’être. It considers that “Indeed, whilst various measures have been taken at European
Union level to guarantee a high level of safety for citizens, there is an equal need to
address specific problems that can arise when a person is suspected or accused in crim-
inal proceedings”62and that “This calls for specific action on procedural rights, in order
to ensure the fairness of the criminal proceedings. Such action, which can comprise
legislation as well as other measures, will enhance citizens′ confidence that the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States will protect and guarantee their rights.”63The aims
of the Council are clear, as can also be gathered from the reflections included in the
Roadmap itself64: With a view of enhancing mutual trust as well as the mutual recogni-
tion based hereupon between member states, it calls for the introduction of minimum
standards that subsequently have to be correctly implemented and applied. Notwith-
standing the potential of the Roadmap to lift the criminal procedures of member states
to a higher level of protection65and thereby to improve the (procedural) rights of per-
sons involved, it can be called into question whether this approach will effectively of-
fer a better solution for tackling the identified threats to cooperation in criminal cases.
Since the inception of the Roadmap, a lot of ink has been spilled over the instrument’s
competence and scope.66Although legal doctrine still formulates the necessary critical
questions concerning the EU’s competence with regard to the introduction of mini-
mum standards for situations that can (also) be qualified as merely domestic issues on
60 Measure A on translation and interpretation; Measure B on information on rights and infor-
mation about the charges; Measure C on legal advice and legal aid; Measure D on communi-
cation with relatives, employers and consular authorities; Measure E on special safeguards
for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable; Measure F Green Paper on pre-trial
detention.
61 Measure A was turned in Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and the Council
of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. OJ
L/280, 26 October 2010; Measure BB in Directive 2012/12/EU of the European Parliament
and the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings. OJ L/
142, 1 June 2012; Measures C and D where comprised in Directive 2013/48/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in
criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a
third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and
with consular authorities while deprived of liberty. OJ 2013 L 294, 6 November 2013.
62 Ibid. (fn. 59), Consideration (4).
63 Ibid. (fn. 59), Consideration (5).
64 Consideration (8) of the Procedural Roadmap clearly states that Mutual recognition presup-
poses that the competent authorities of the Member States trust the criminal justice systems
of other Member States. For the purpose of enhancing mutual trust within the European
Union, it is important that, complementary to the Convention, there exist European Union
standards for the protection of procedural rights which are properly implemented and ap-
plied in the Member States.
65 Vermeulen, Panopticon 2013, p. 349.
66 The right to information, the presence of a lawyer, etc. as provided for in the Directives are
after all also applicable in sheer domestic criminal procedures, so it appears that the Union is
stretching its competence.
200 Michaël Meysman · Belgium and the European Arrest Warrant 
ARTICLES
https://doi.org/10.5771/2193-5505-2016-2-186
Generiert durch Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, am 02.04.2020, 12:08:34.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
the basis of article 82,2. TFEU67, it appears that both the Union and its member states
tend to run along with this option for the time being. This being the case, the first hur-
dle – which seemed insurmountable when the framework decision for procedural
rights was first suggested – at least appears to have been taken. More important, per-
haps, is the precise goal that was set for the Roadmap. In its considerations68the instru-
ment clearly refers to its complementary role vis à vis the ECHR in order to ensure an
improved compliance with the Convention and its additional protocols as an essential
condition for mutual trust between member states. The fact that such complementary
action appears to be necessary on a procedural level in order to guarantee the ’fairness’
of procedures, means that the Union once more seems to acknowledge the unsatisfac-
tory nature of the assumed trust. Yet in defence of this view it can be noted that the
diversity that exists in terms of application of the ECHR within the different member
states, as well as the often insurmountable conditions for a procedure at the Court69,
often hamper an effective guarantee of individual rights.70It therefore is to be wel-
comed that additional measures are taken on an EU level in order to protect procedu-
ral rights.
It seems more difficult, however, to offer an explanation as to how the Roadmap can
be understood within the framework of a reappraisal of mutual recognition, given the
instrument now appears to have severed ties with the cross-border dimension of crimi-
nal cases. This is due to the fact that the procedural safeguards that have already been
created are (also) applicable in strictly internal matters and moreover fail to elucidate
how they will function in the presence of already existing instruments that are based
on mutual recognition. Clearly, the Roadmap and the ensuing guidelines do not eye a
modification of the existing instruments, let alone the introduction of additional
grounds for refusal or margins of appreciation. One could moreover argue that the
current Directives are focusing on rather traditional rights to complement a package of
tools that already seems sufficiently developed with regard to his matter.71Without
aiming to detract from the essential nature of e.g. a right to translation, one could argue
that such rights are already sufficiently reflected in the ECHR and its additional proto-
67 Article 82, 2 TFEU clearly states “to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition…in
criminal matters having a cross border dimension…may...establish minimum rules”. As such,
there needs to be a clear trans-boundary dimension and a link with mutual recognition in
criminal matters. See: W. De Bondt & G. Vermeulen, The procedural rights debate A bridge
too far or still not far enough? Eucrim(4), 2010, pp. 163-167; T. Marguery, European Union
fundamental rights and member states action in EU criminal law. Maastricht Journal,
20(2013/2), 2013, pp. 282-301; Morgan, European Human Rights Law Review 2012.
68 Ibid. (fn. 59), Considerations (1) & (2).
69 By means of example: In its judgment of 22 May 1998 in the case of Hozee v. Netherlands
(App. No.21961/93), the ECtHR ruled that, after 18 years of litigation, the reasonable term
as included in Article 6 ECHR was not breached. As such, a more than reasonable persever-
ance and time, money, means and luck are expected of the applicants, not to mention the
Court’s stringent admissibility threshold.
70 P. Langford, Extradition and fundamental rights: the perspective of the European Court of
Human Rights. The International Journal of Human Rights, 13(04), 2009, pp. 512-529.
71 De Bondt & Vermeulen, Eucrim 2010, p. 165; Marguery, Maastricht Journal 2013.
Michaël Meysman · Belgium and the European Arrest Warrant 201
EuCLR Vol. 6, 2/2016
https://doi.org/10.5771/2193-5505-2016-2-186
Generiert durch Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, am 02.04.2020, 12:08:34.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
cols, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the fundamental
rights that ensue from member states’ constitutional traditions.72Complementing such
rights via the Roadmap in order to ensure better compliance – which, as indeed has
been established, has its shortcomings – is a good thing, but leaves room for improve-
ment: The complete absence of attention for procedural rights in the (pre-trial) phase
of the collection of evidence can be termed a missed opportunity. With the contentieux
of both the ECHR and the Court according little attention to this, it follows that a
complementary approach in this field would be welcome. With the European Investi-
gation Order in the pipeline, we can moreover point out the current attention given to
this matter within the field of mutual recognition.73Clearly, the opportunity to react
swiftly to developments and create procedural guarantees in this matter has not (yet)
been acted upon.
The ambiguity that exists with regard to the Roadmap’s relation with cross-border
cooperation and the decision to opt for more traditional procedural rights (for the time
being), give rise to the fear that the Roadmap will not be able to strengthen mutual
trust and cooperation in the Union. However, in spite of the fact that the Roadmap
finds its foundation in treaty law, this does not always appear to be the Union’s main
goal. Rather than reviewing the package of existing (or future) instruments based on
mutual recognition in the light of the increasing number of issues concerning human
rights, the EU appears to be striving for a union-wide upgrade of procedural rights
outside the framework of any cross-border elements determined by treaty law. An im-
portant indication in this regard was already formulated back in 2009, when the proce-
dural Roadmap stated in its consideration (10) that it strives “to strengthen procedural
guarantees and the respect of the rule of law in criminal proceedings, no matter where
citizens decide to travel, study, work or live in the European Union.” Clearly this goes
beyond a cross-border context in criminal law and merely repairing trust in (the in-
struments of) mutual recognition. One can superfluously refer to the impact report
that accompanies the proposition concerning the Guideline for procedural guarantees
attributed to children in procedures of criminal law, in which the Commission plainly
states that the Guideline is (/will be) implemented in disregard of any cross-border
connotation.74
72 Article 6 CFREU.
73 Vermeulen, Pantopticon 2013.
74 Point 4.5.1, paragraph 2 of the: European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORK-
ING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Proposal for a on procedural safe-
guards for children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings /* SWD/2013/0480 final
*/., 2013, p. 31. Via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0
480.
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Fundamental rights between protection and cooperation? The reluctance of the
European Court of Justice
The procedural Roadmap appears to carry the banner of the importance and improve-
ment accorded to fundamental (procedural) rights by the Union. The fact that the
Roadmap, in trying to achieve this goal, does not aim (directly) at the instruments for
cooperation – and this in spite of its basis in treaty law- begs the question of the rela-
tion between an effective protection of fundamental rights on the one hand, and the
necessity of effective European cooperation in criminal matters on the other. The most
puzzling question undoubtedly resides in situations where member states find them-
selves confronted with a request (or order) for cooperation by a second member state,
and have to address the issue of a potential decline due to a lack of fundamental rights
compliance by the issuing member state. These rights can either ensue from a coun-
try's own constitution or from the EU Charter and the ECHR. The (complementary)
safeguards of the procedural roadmap can now also be added to this list. This type of
issue also constituted the base of the KI’s judgement in the Jauregui Espina case, where
it was decided on the basis of available reports that a surrender in accordance with the
European Arrest Warrant was not possible according to the human rights related
ground for refusal established in the Belgian “Wet EAB”. As mentioned above, such a
ground for refusal was introduced as an own-initiative measure by a number of mem-
ber states which found permission for this in preamble and article 1(3) of the Frame-
work Decision of the EAW.
Such introductions, as mentioned earlier, were only very meagrely appreciated by
the European Commission.75Comparing the grounds for refusal that exist in the mem-
ber states that have provided for one, it becomes apparent that they still come in many
different shapes and interpretations.76A significant number of member states moreover
have not acquired this big stick. As such, there is no common view within the Union
as to how and when human rights can give rise to an exception with regard to the use
of instruments of mutual recognition. This diversity causes the arrest warrant to oper-
ate in a legal limbo77as far as fundamental rights are concerned, given that the frame-
work decision itself only provides for limited grounds for refusal and refrains from ex-
plicitly mentioning the human rights exception. It is not just variety that exists in
member states, however, that raises a number of questions. This is also the case for the
increasing number of tools that exist on fundamental rights: What is the relation of the
2.
75 European Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender pro-
cedures between Member States (revised version) {SEC(2006)79} /* COM/2006/0008 final
*/, 2006.Via: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2006:0008:FIN:EN:HTML. In this report, the Commission indicated that roughly 2/3rds of
the member states used this reasoning to introduce a human rights refusal ground.
76 A. Tinsley, The Reference in case C-396/11 Radu: When does the protection of fundamental
rights require non-execution of a European arrest warrant? European Criminal Law Review
(EuCLR), 2(3), 2012, pp. 338-352.
77 Ibid. p. 341.
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EU fundamental rights Charter to the ECHR, more specifically regarding the inter-
pretation of the Human Rights Court’s doctrine concerning flagrant violations in the
context of cooperation in criminal cases? Can a member state refuse collaboration on
the basis of a potential violation of the Charter, while there is a possibility that the vio-
lation does not meet the threshold of the ECHR, as interpreted by the Court? Where
can we situate the additional safeguards of the Roadmap’s Directives in this context?
These questions tend to create a stern headache for both the person involved as well as
the state that finds itself confronted with an arrest warrant. While the former’s salva-
tion lies – ad ultimum – beyond the towering threshold established by the European
Court of Human Rights and its flagrant violation doctrine, the member state has to
turn to the European Court of Justice. This EU institution therefore holds the key to
safeguarding the uniformity as well as conformity of European Cooperation in crimi-
nal cases in relation to the fundamental rights.78
In two recent judgments, the Court found itself confronted with such a question in
the wake of an EAW procedure. The aforementioned Radu case and the Melloni case79
presented the court with a golden opportunity to dot the i's and cross the t's as far as
the difficult relation between the EAW and the fundamental rights were concerned. In
the first case, the Court had to pronounce itself on the relation between fundamental
rights as included in the EU Charter and the ECHR and a requested European arrest
Warrant. Romania, as sought executing state had not included the human rights viola-
tion clause as a grounds for refusal and now had reflect upon whether Mr. Radu was in
a position to invoke the (flagrant violation of) the human rights included in the Char-
ter and the ECHR80 in order for his surrender to be refused. As mentioned earlier, the
Advocate General in this case did not show herself averse to thorough reflections on
the relation between mutual recognition on the one hand and respect for fundamental
rights on the other81, the importance of which cannot be denied on at least a symbolic
level. The Court, however, shied away from following Sharpston’s engaging advice, li-
mited its vision to one specific observation – in casu Radu not having been heard prior
to the issuing of the EAW – and even on that account retreated to the familiar rhetoric
on mutual trust between member states. Confronted with a context of European coop-
eration in criminal cases, the Court even seems to be stepping back from the rather
78 P. Asp, N. Bitzilekis, S. Bogdan, T. Elholm, L. Foffani, D. Frände,...,& F. Zimmerman, A
manifesto on European criminal procedure law – European Criminal Policy Initiative.
Zeitschrift für International Strafrechtsdogmatik 11, 2013, pp. 430-446.




80 Part of the debate was also the question of whether fundamental rights should be considered
as primary EU law since the Lisbon Reform Treaty, even if they were not foreseen as such at
the time of the conception of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.
81 Sharpston even opened the door for a more flexible approach regarding the ‘flagrant denial’
doctrine of the ECtHR, by stating that potential infringements should not be established
‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
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progressive attitude adopted in the NS. case (in the context of the common policy on
asylum).82Hopes to the effect that the Court would choose the path of more decisive
action in this context over the following years were also met with disappointment.
In the Melloni case, the Court concluded that a member state cannot apply a higher
national standard of fundamental rights protection to refuse an issued arrest warrant
that complies with the (lower standard of) protection established by the EU Charter.
Once again, the Court confirms that any other assessment would work to the detri-
ment of the fundamental principles of mutual trust and the recognition which the
framework decision aims to enhance. This would moreover compromise the expedien-
cy of the framework decision given the uniformity of the fundamental rights protec-
tion, as established in the instrument, would be put up for discussion.83An important
aspect of the Court’s reasoning for this refusal was that the EU had already established
a harmonisation pathway and that allowing a higher national level of fundamental
rights protection would therefore run counter to the aim of the provision to provide a
common understanding of that refusal ground (in casu concerning in absentia deci-
sions).84Hence, Janssens rightfully states that in areas where the EU legislator has es-
tablished (common minimum) definitions at EU level, the member states’ margin of
action will be smaller in cases where no common definitions exist and that the princi-
ple of mutual recognition will be more powerful – with more limited exception to this
principle – where approximation is available.85Concurrently with the Melloni case, the
Court also ruled the Akerberg Fransson judgment86 in which it is stated – although not
in the context of cross-border collaboration in criminal cases – that member states are
bound to uphold the fundamental rights established in the Charter when their actions
fall within the scope of the law of the Union.87 It is clear that the Court ensured that
both judgements were attuned to one another, on the one hand by guaranteeing that
the Charter is valid whenever the law of the Union is applicable, and on the other by
considering that same Charter as the ultimate upper limit as far as the human rights
82 It needs mentioning, however, that the Court of Justice would perhaps have been more re-
luctant, should not the Human Rights Court had settled a similar discussion with “a re-
sounding condemnation” in the case of MSS. v. Belgium & Greece. See:N. Mole, The com-
plex and evolving relationship between the European Union and the European Convention
on Human Rights, European Human Rights Law Review (EHRLR), Issue 4., 2012, p. 366.
83 Ibid. (fn. 79), Consideration 63.
84 H. Labayle, Mandatd’arrêteuropéen et degré de protection des droits fondamentaux, quand
la confiance se fait aveugle. Groupe de Recherche – EspaceLibertéSécurité Justice, 2013.
http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2013/03/03/cooperation-judiciaire-penale/mandat-darret-europeen-
et-degre-de-protection-des-droits-fondamentaux-quand-la-confiance-se-fait-aveugle/print/;
R. van der Hulle& R. van der Hulle, De arresten Akerberg Fransson en Melloni gerela-
tiveerd, Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht (SEW), J, March, 2014, pp. 102-116;
I. Armada, The European Investigation Order and the Lack of European Standards for
Gathering Evidence. Is a Fundamental Rights-Based Refusal the Solution? New Journal of
European Criminal Law, 6(1), 2015, pp. 8-31.
85 C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law, Oxford Studies in European
Law, OUP Oxford, 2013, p. 204.
86 European Court of Justice, 26.2.2013, Case C-617/10 (Åklagaren/ Hans Åkerberg Fransson)
87 R. van der Hulle& R. van der Hulle, SEW 2014.
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guarantees are concerned which needs to be respected by member states, particularly
when they are confronted with an issued measure within the field of European cooper-
ation in criminal cases. Lastly, in its Opinion on the accession of the EU to the ECHR,
the Court indicated that the accession to the ECHR would be contrarious to the prin-
ciple of mutual trust as it would potentially open the gates for states to check the fun-
damental rights situation in the member state that has demanded its cooperation in the
AFSJ.88
This analysis demonstrates the reluctance of the Court of Justice to express itself
clearly and unambiguously on the relation between fundamental rights, trust between
states, and mutual recognition in criminal cases. Yet, this is exactly where the shoe
doesn't fit. The differences that exist between member states with regard to the inclu-
sion, interpretation and implementation of a grounds for refusal based on a possible
violation of human rights within the procedures of the European arrest warrant beg a
clear analysis from the Court. In the Radu case, the Court chose to hide behind the
doctrine of mutual trust rather than pronounce itself on the existing thresholds – con-
sidered too high by the Advocate General – to successfully refuse an arrest warrant.
Yet, as confirmed by the Advocate General in the Lopes Da Silva Jorge case89, it would
be rather absurd to assume that member states should accept the possibility of human
rights violations for the sake of ensuring a smooth collaboration, as long as said viola-
tions are not spilling over the thresholds established in the ECHR and the Charter.
The complex relation between the several fundamental rights of various origins is also
deserving of a uniform approach, in particular in a time when the safeguards of the
procedural roadmap are increasingly gaining in prominence. Their role and place needs
clarification, lest we end up in a situation in which member states risk to be held liable
by the Court of Justice for failing to comply with the obligations that arise from the
Roadmap’s Directives, while they would effortlessly pass the test of the Charter within
a framework of cross border cooperation in criminal matters.
On 24th of July, 2015, the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in Bremen, Germany, re-
quested in a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in the Aranyosi case90 -which
88 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 18.12.2014, Opinion 2/13. See especially Para. 191: “That
principle (mutual trust) requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security
and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other
Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights
recognised by EU law.” And Para. 194 “In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU
and the Member States to be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with
Contracting Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also in their relations with
each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, require a Member State
to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law
imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to
upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.”
89 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 5.9.2012, Case C-42/11 (courd’appeld’Amiens /João Pedro
Lopes Da Silva Jorge).See also: Tinsley, EuCLR 2012, pp. 347-348.
90 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 24.7.2015, case C-404/15 (Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bre-
men/ PálAranyosi). Via:http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&do-
cid=167520&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=869267
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was later joined with the Căldăraru91 case – whether “Article 1(3) of the Council
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant is to be interpreted as meaning
that extradition for the purposes of prosecution is impermissible where there are
strong indications that detention conditions in the issuing Member State infringe the
fundamental rights of the person concerned and the fundamental legal principles as en-
shrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, or is it to be interpreted as
meaning that, in such circumstances, the executing Member State can or must make the
decision on the permissibility of extradition conditional upon an assurance that deten-
tion conditions are compliant? To that end, can or must the executing Member State
lay down specific minimum requirements applicable to the detention conditions in re-
spect of which an assurance is sought?” With such a clearly structured demand for cla-
rification/interpretation of the FD EAW’s stance on fundamental rights in relation to
detention conditions, and with the Radu and Melloni cases behind us, the Court’s an-
swer was eagerly awaited. Very recently, on 3rdMarch, 2016, Advocate General Bot
presented his Opinion on the joint cases.92 Following a rather extensive exposition (in-
cluding reference to the ECJ’s N.s. case), the Advocate General concluded that Article
1(3) of the FD EAW must be interpreted in such a way that it does not constitute a
motive to refuse cooperation and execution of a European Arrest Warrant, based on
the risk of a violation of fundamental rights in the issuing member state. It is solely up
to the judicial authorities of the issuing state to assess the proportionality and necessity
of issuing a European Arrest Warrant.93The complex relationship between the funda-
mental rights and mutual recognition was deserving of a uniform approach – as indi-
cated above – and their role and place in want of clarification. With this opinion by the
Advocate General, undoubtedly a crisp and clear answer hereto is provided, but its
content may be assessed as “deeply troubling”.94This line of reasoning fully accords a
higher legal status to the principle of mutual recognition than to (the protection of) the
fundamental rights of the individual involved in EAW procedures. Moreover, the deci-
91 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 9.12.2015, Case C-659/15 PPU (HanseatischesOberlandes-
gericht/ Căldăraru).
92 Y. Bot, Conclusions de l’AvocatGénéral, Affaires C-404/15 et C-659/15 PPU, présentées le 3
mars 2016. Available via (French only):http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:62015CC0404&qid=1458121305625&from=EN.
93 Bot, 2016 (fn. 93), para 183 et sequitur (literally): “L’article 1er, paragraphe 3, de la décision-
cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil, du 13 juin 2002, relative au mandatd’arrêteuropéen et aux
procédures de remise entre Étatsmembres, tellequemodifiéepar la décision-cadre
2009/299/JAI du Conseil, du 26 février 2009, doitêtreinterprétéencesensqu’il ne constitue pas
un motif de non-exécution du mandatd’arrêteuropéenémis aux fins de l’exercice de pour-
suitespénalesou de l’exécutiond’unepeineoud’unemesure privatives de liberté, fondésur le
risqued’une violation, dansl’Étatmembred’émission, des droits fondamentaux de la personne
remise. Il appartient aux autoritésjudiciairesd’émission de procéder à un contrôle de propor-
tionnalitéafind’ajuster la nécessitéd’émettre un mandatd’arrêteuropéen au regard de la nature
de l’infraction et des modalitésconcrètesd’exécution de la peine.”
94 See Fair Trials International and Antigone’s Opinion Letter and request to the Commission-
er for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Jourová here: http://statewatch.org/news/
2016/mar/eu-european-arrest-warrant-ecj-bot-opinion-letter.pdf.
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sion to issue an EAW and the assessment of the proportionality and justness hereof re-
mains the sole prerogative of the issuing state. For what concerns the analysis above,
this – at least – would stultify the Belgian Court of Cassation’s reasoning in the Jau-
regui Espina case. Inherently non-legally binding, it remains to be seen how the Court
will assess the AG’s conclusion and ultimately decide on its opinion.
The missing link? Collaboration between member states and third countries that are
party to the ECHR
The preceding headings already pointed out the risks inherent in the legal twilight
zone that is the EAW's turf. The diversity that exists between member states in terms
of interpretation and implementation of the human rights argument as an exception for
European cooperation, as well as the increasing complexity that has been created by a
multi-track approach that has failed to sufficiently elucidate the necessary coherence
between fundamental rights and additional safeguards, result in a reduced (procedural)
position for the individual involved. At the same time, the member states also remain
in the dark on how to find a legitimate balance between smooth collaboration on the
one hand and the insurance that fundamental rights are guaranteed, on the other. The
Union's reaction to the above illustrated tendency towards decreasing mutual trust
consisted in producing the procedural Roadmap. The lack of a consistent and elucidat-
ing analysis of the European Court of Justice as to how European cooperation in crim-
inal cases should relate to fundamental rights, as well as the missing link with this co-
operation in the approach of the Roadmap, mean that the question regarding the EU’s
(and the Roadmap’s) aim and purpose remains unanswered. Specifically in terms of
whether indeed an efficient and just cooperation was envisioned.95
The significant gap that exists in the approach of the Union with regard to coopera-
tion in criminal cases and fundamental rights between EU member states on the one
side, and third states that are members of the Council of Europe (CoE) on the other,
constitutes an indication to the contrary – or at least to the effect that such high-brow
concerns stop at the European Union's borders. After all, when the essence of mutual
recognition is called to mind, the common membership of the ECHR serves as the
most important indication for the states' joint commitment to fundamental rights.
When this became untenable due to a long series of judgements issued by the Court of
95 Vermeulen seems to deny this last assertion and states that the procedural roadmap, in con-
sideration (10), already showed that “efforts should be deployed to strengthen procedural
guarantees and the respect of the rule of law in criminal proceedings, no matter where citi-
zens decide to travel, study, work or live in the European Union” which clearly indicates
that an improved Union in terms of procedural rights is the goal, rather than improving co-
operation. This goal would be contrarious to the historical aversion of the member states vis-
à-vis harmonization on an EU level of their criminal systems. See: G. Vermeulen, Flaws and
contradictions in the mutual trust and recognition discourse: casting a shadow on the legiti-
macy of EU criminal policy making & judicial cooperation in criminal matters? in: Persak
N, editor. Legitimacy and trust in criminal law policy and justice. Ashgate; 2014. pp. 153–75.
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Human Rights, the EU changed its tack and launched the Roadmap Guidelines. The
latter's prior concern, however, seems directed first and foremost towards harmonising
national minimum standards, rather than towards guaranteeing fundamental rights
within a cross-border context. When one or multiple member states are confronted
with requests for cooperation with a non-EU state that is member of the Council of
Europe (and therefore party to the ECHR) in criminal cases, a two-track policy
emerges. Within the EU – eg. when a request from the CoE member also necessitates
cooperation between the EU member states – one has to operate within a complex sit-
uation that includes multiple sources for protection and member states need to ensure
that minimum standards aimed for by the Roadmap are met. Once the outer border is
crossed, however, these objections would then cease to exist, and cooperation can be
resumed without any problem whatsoever. This at least begs the question of coher-
ence, given that in both cases it concerns a member of the ECHR – the self-proclaimed
foundation for mutual trust. Two interpretations can be put forward with regard to the
notion that trust needs to be shored up with additional procedural guarantees when
EU member states are concerned, while this would no longer be necessary or possible
when it concerns an EU member state and a requesting state that is a member of the
Council of Europe: on the one hand, that the trust between EU member states and
third states with regard to justice and the followed and to be followed procedures is
such that additional guarantees are unnecessary in this context96, and on the other hand
that the latter issue no longer appears to be of concern to the Union once its borders
are crossed. Both interpretations are detrimental to the strengthening of trust and
counterproductive for European cooperation in criminal cases.
Conclusion
The identified European trend and the concrete example of the Jauregui Espina case
offer sufficient food for thought when it comes to the future for the European Union
in the context of cooperation in criminal cases. Although it is far from the only case in
which an arrest warrant was met with refusal on the basis of a possible violation of hu-
man rights, the Jauregui Espina case offers an interesting point of departure because of
the confrontation with precedents and the evolution that has taken place in points of
view since then. In addition, its terror-related nature (the momentum created by ter-
rorism is still considered the breeding ground for the – initial – instruments of mutual
recognition) is interesting when seen against the background of the tendency towards
increasing insight into the limits and limitations of mutual recognition in criminal cas-
es. With the strong statements made by the KI of Ghent and the confirmation by Bel-
gium's highest ranking court, the case constitutes the umpteenth proof of the fact that
the Union urgently needs to reflect upon its current and future arsenal of instruments
VII.
96 Which would imply that the compliance with fundamental rights within a wider CoE con-
text would be unproblematic, an assumption that is profoundly contradicted by scholars and
the Human Rights Court’s case law.
Michaël Meysman · Belgium and the European Arrest Warrant 209
EuCLR Vol. 6, 2/2016
https://doi.org/10.5771/2193-5505-2016-2-186
Generiert durch Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, am 02.04.2020, 12:08:34.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
based on mutual trust and the relation with fundamental rights. Now that the principle
has been formally enshrined through the Lisbon Treaty, the EU – not for the first
time – is trying to fend off criticism with an ambitious Roadmap. The (re)appraisal and
strengthening of procedural rights through the introduction of minimum standards
however raises questions with regard to the legitimacy and competence of the Union
to do this. Moreover, significant doubts can be entertained over the aim of strengthen-
ing mutual recognition on this basis, given that the connection with mutual recogni-
tion seems out of sight. Notwithstanding the fact that the Directives already created
constitute a potential improvement for the position of the individual in a criminal pro-
cedure, it can be suggested that the EU gets it wrong by introducing additions where
these are not really necessary, while the issue of much-needed attention for other (pro-
cedural) aspect in criminal cases has been left unaddressed. In what way fundamental
rights should be expressed within European cooperation in criminal cases, is a question
that for the time being remains unanswered by the EU Court of Justice. The fact that
such clarification is necessary, clearly emerges from the problems referred to in this ar-
ticle. Member states currently have to operate in a legal twilight zone. This is not con-
ducive consistency, places diversity and arbitrariness in the driver seat, and potentially
exposes individuals involved in such procedures to situations that are detrimental to
fundamental rights.
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